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Abstract
We report on an experiment in which subjects older than 55 years old
and subjects younger than 26 years old play repeatedly 4 versions of the
centipede game. For each game we define four treatments that allow us
to study cooperation and belief formation of these two age groups. We
find that beliefs about the others’ age group shape the outcome: while
seniors are cooperative and generous with juniors when they incur lower
opportunity costs, for juniors it is when playing with seniors that they
learn the way to the theoretical solution by smoothly decreasing their
cooperation levels.
Key Words: Centipede Game, Age di↵erences, Decision Making, Beliefs,
Social Preferences.
In this paper, we report on a series of experiments which study intergener-
ational cooperation through the implementation of centipede games in the lab,
by inviting participants of both an older and a younger cohort.
Only few papers within the field of experimental and behavioral economics
incorporate younger and adult age groups in their investigations (Kovalchik
et al., 2005; Holm and Nystedt, 2005; Sutter, 2007; Gu¨th et al., 2007; Char-
ness and Villeval, 2009). However, only Holm and Nystedt (2005), Gu¨th et al.
(2007) and Charness and Villeval (2009) studied teams composed of di↵erent
age groups. Holm and Nystedt (2005) run a trust game using two Swedish co-
horts –one of 20 years old and the other one of 70 years old– and found that
the younger cohort sent significantly higher amounts than the older cohort, and
that first movers were more trustful with members of their own age cohort.
Gu¨th et al. (2007) run a large scale newspaper experiment where 5,132 read-
ers of the German weekly, Die Zeit, participated in a three-person bargaining
game and found that ”proposing an equitable distribution gets more important
and frequent with increasing age”. Last, Charness and Villeval (2009) run their
studies within the context of the labor market. Their results show two interest-
ing findings from a public good experiment. First, the contribution of seniors
is higher than of juniors in nearly all periods; second, heterogeneous teams are
more cooperative than homogeneous teams.
The previous experimental studies reveal that there are indeed di↵erences in
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trust, trustworthiness and cooperation among younger and older cohorts, and
these di↵erences become more or less salient depending on the age group of
their matching team. Nevertheless, not much has been said on the repeated
interaction among these cohorts. Understanding this is important because in-
tergenerational conflicts may arise when interests of di↵erent age groups do not
converge, for instance when it comes to evaluate the expected outcome of ne-
gotiations dealing with di↵erent national budget allocations (eg. pension fund
policies, increasing taxes,...).
The reasons for choosing the centipede game for our studies relies on the
following: First, it involves repeated interactions in a context where incentives
to repeatedly reciprocate lead to increasing payo↵s, unless one of the players
defect, in which case he keeps more of the payo↵ than his matching partner.
Second, it comprises a set of sequential interactions such that at each infor-
mation node each player acts how he thinks best given his beliefs about the
opponent. Third, following McKelvey and Palfrey (1992, p. 803) ”we have cho-
sen an environment in which we expect the Nash equilibrium to perform at its
worst” to see the way di↵erent age groups deviate from rational predictions,
and thus allows us to study the extent to which beliefs about the other genera-
tion’s rationality and other regarding preferences a↵ect the outcome of the game.
Our main finding is that for both age groups, belief formation about the age
group of the opponent shapes the outcome as follows:
1. For both age groups, taˆtonnement -or experimentation- mainly occurs
when playing against subjects belonging to the same age group.
2. Juniors give their opponents the same chances to cooperate, regardless on
whether they belong to the same or to a di↵erent age group.
3. Seniors prefer cooperating with seniors more than with juniors.
4. For seniors, reciprocity is payo↵ driven and occurs for lower opportunity
costs.
The reminder of our paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the centipede
game, and explicits our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the experimental design,
including the subject pool and the experimental procedures. Section 4 presents
and discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
1 The Centipede Game and Hypothesis
1.1 Centipede Game
The Centipede Game, first introduced by Rosenthal (1981), belongs to the fam-
ily of sequential games, with perfect information, that are solved through Back-
ward Induction, such as the game of Nim (Bouton, 1901-02) and the Chain
Store (Selten, 1974). It can be described as follows. On sequential trials two
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players alternate in deciding whether to continue the game or to stop it. At
every decision node the payo↵ distribution favors the player that has the op-
portunity to choose whether stopping or continuing the game; i.e. the mover.
If the mover decides to stop, then the players receive the proposed distribution
at that period. If instead of stopping the mover chooses to continue, the sum of
the payo↵s increases, and the distribution switches in favor of the other player:
the mover is fined and the other player is rewarded. The game can continue
until a terminal node. Even though the game o↵ers the chance to the players
to eventually increase their payo↵, the game theoretical –or rational– solution
predicts that the first mover should stop at the very first opportunity.
We illustrate the intuition behind the Backward Induction solution using
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Centipede Game: Example
The sequence starts with two players –A and B– in node 1, and goes from
left to right. The first row of the payo↵s corresponds to player A, the second
to player B. Let’s assume the game reached node 4, where player B makes the
last move of the game: he has to decide whether to stop or to continue. The
payo↵ maximizing choice will be to stop, otherwise he would be choosing to
have less instead of more (4 instead of 5). At the previous node, node 3, player
A must choose between stopping the game and keep 3, or continuing to node
4 where he knows the rational choice would be for player B to stop and then
he will have a payo↵ of 2. Both players face the same trade o↵ in each node.
Given that, the first mover –player A– will choose to stop the game at his very
first opportunity even if it is clear that both players would be better o↵ if they
choose to continue. Stopping at the first opportunity results in the optimum
choice for a rational mover, which in words of Colman (2003, p. 149), ”is an
almost intolerably counterintuitive conclusion”.
As a matter of fact, existing experimental evidence suggests that most prob-
ably agents will not engage in backward induction as much as it is theoretically
expected. Studies of the centipede game show that indeed only few players
choose to stop the game at their very first chance (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992;
Fey et al., 1996; Nagel and Tang, 1997; Rapoport et al., 2003). Running a series
of 4 nodes’ and 6 nodes’ centipede games, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) find
that less than 2% of the games result in the sub-game theoretical predictions,
but also find that for only 5% of the games the last mover chooses to continue:
3
the majority of the games stop in the middle nodes. Later on, Fey et al. (1996)
ran several 6 and 10 nodes’ constant-sum centipede games to test for backward
induction. In those games the sum of the payo↵s are the same at every node, but
the distribution changes along the game from equal to unequal in favor of one
and the other player in turns. They found that the 10 nodes’ centipede game
exhibits higher number of rational outcomes, but these are still far from being
the theoretical expected 100% of stops at the first node: on average, 52% of
the games continue after the first node. The highest percentage of stops at the
first node was found by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009). The authors run their
experiments using subjects that are very much used to the backward induction
argument –professional chess players– to find that nearly 70% of the games are
solved through backward induction and that 100% of the Chess Grand Masters
stop the game at their first opportunity. More interesting, their study consid-
ers 4 treatments, each of them combining students and chess players, and the
stopping rates vary substantially among them. Finally, using chess players as
well, Levitt et al. (2011) show results at odds with Palacios-Huerta and Volij
(2009), since only 3.9% of the games stop in the first node. Moreover, they ran
a race game to prove that stopping at the first node is not even related to an
”inability to reason backwards” (Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2009, 3).
Experimental evidence reveals the clear conflict between the theoretical pre-
diction, and what seems to be an intuitive behavior: why do players deviate
from the rational solution? One wave of research suggests that a player devi-
ates from the rational choice when he believes there is a small probability that
his matching partner will also deviate (Kreps et al., 1982; Petit and Sudgen,
1989; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992). These beliefs would influence him to devi-
ate in order to build a reputation of cooperation that would convince the partner
to cooperate as well, thus reaching further nodes. A second wave of studies em-
phasizes on the role of other regarding preferences, such as fairness concerns
and altruism, to explain what seems to be so far understood as an irrational
behavior (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004). A third wave of research suggests that also the ability to reason following
backward induction (Levitt et al., 2011) may prevent subjects to behave ”ratio-
nally”. All waves of literature would be contesting backward induction as the
unique valid argument to predict and explain behavior in strategic situations.
Particularly when it comes to analyze the centipede game, it seems backward
induction performing specially poorly would be related to its two assumptions
behind: expected utility maximization and common knowledge. The first as-
sumption conforms to the standard economic ones’. The second assumption
implies that all the players know that all the players know that all the players
are rational1 (or irrational). When going backwards starting from the last node,
backward induction makes sense. What would happen if we go forward from
the first node? Do we arrive to the same conclusion about backward induction
being the only rational choice? If player A stops the game at the first node,
1We assume in this paper that a rational player -or selfish money maximizer player- makes
a rational move, being the orthodox rational move to stop at the first chance. For further
discussion on rational player and rational moves, please refer to Binmore (1994)
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that implies his expected utility of stopping exceeds his expected utility of con-
tinuing. If we look at the game, that is indeed not the case: the utility derived
from the last nodes is higher than the one from the first nodes (if he reaches
these nodes). Would it be irrational that player A moves toward trying to get
to the last node? We do not think so. Following the first wave of literature,
if his beliefs about player B include a small but su ciently large chance that
player B responds cooperatively and continues the game to the last node, player
A will continue the game at the first node. Turning to player B, in case player
A continues the game at the first node, he could believe that player A is an
irrational player or that player A is asking for cooperation. What should player
B do then? According to Aumann (1992), a rational player stops the game
regardless how he got to the point of deciding.
Even though Aumann insists that backward induction holds still, it is yet
not clear how player A decides: if he considers there is a chance that player
B will continue the game, it is intuitively clear that there is no certain fact in
which player A could in a first pass assess the expected outcome of stopping
or continuing. It seems the game theoretical solution would only make sense if
both players are 100% convinced about each other’s rationality, and that this
rationality is the one that dictates to stop at the first chance.
In summary, players stopping at their first opportunity seems logical, but
”intuitively implausible” (Petit and Sudgen, 1989, p. 171): that is the backward
induction paradox.
Given that backward induction is the game theoretical solution, but the
”let’s cooperate” is the practical one, we can suspect that many other pieces of
the game theoretical puzzle could be misleading. Following Petit and Sudgen
(1989), one player may believe that his opponent is rational, ”but that does
not entitle him to believe that [same thing] in subsequent rounds”. If beliefs
about the other change given my actions and given the others’ actions in such
a short period of time as the duration of a centipede game, when it comes to
study individual decision making, we could think that it does not stay constant
throughout our lives (Kovalchik et al., 2005; Holm and Nystedt, 2005; Sutter,
2007).
As long as there is one known final period with known payo↵s, backward
induction may hold. This is the case, for instance, when it comes to analyze
sequential negotiations, educational choices, and/or pension funds options. Yet
when the final period becomes blurry, rationality may be related to how to
keep more, though not necessarily all, in order to cover for the time after the
final period. This is exactly the case when uncertainty about whether one will
over-live the statistical life expectancy starts gaining importance. All decisions
made until then on how to share income among the society and with others may
indeed be based on di↵erent motivations and intentions, and not necessarily on
backward induction arguments or skills. In that context, other regarding pref-
erences (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004), the altruist imitator strategy (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992), and the abil-
ity to reason following backward induction (Gneezy et al., 2010; Levitt et al.,
2011), may all play an important role in shaping this intergenerational conflict.
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1.2 Hypotheses
The following sections aim at disentangling intergenerational cooperation using
centipede games. Hence, we guide our study on the following.
Hypothesis 1 Players stop the game at the first chance they have to move.
Hypothesis 2 Playing the game repeatedly does not a↵ect the behavior sug-
gested in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 hold for all players, regardless of
their own age and the age of their opponent.
Hypothesis 4 In case Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are rejected, we do not
expect systematic in-group di↵erences among age groups.
2 Experimental Design
We study four versions of the centipede game. The four centipede games have
each four nodes, but di↵erent payo↵ specifications (Reny, 1992)(Game 1 to
Game 4), as illustrated in Figure 2.
(a) Game 1 (b) Game 2
(c) Game 3 (d) Game 4
Figure 2: Payo↵ Specifications
As can be seen from Figure 2, if any of the games reach Node 4, the mover
has here the choice to stop and keep a higher share of the total payo↵, or to
continue at his own stake to equally share the total payo↵ with his opponent
(Rosenthal, 1981). Regardless of the strategy followed by each player to reach
this one last Node, continuing here the game signals that the player equality
concerns vis-a`-vis his opponent enters his utility function: we call this player a
benevolent player.
The di↵erent payo↵ specifications allow us to investigate whether the players
change their strategies across treatments. We would expect them to always stop
at their first chance, but if that does not occur, we would expect them to be
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consistent in their choices regardless of the payo↵ at stake. For instance, if
a player stops the game in Node 3 of Game 1, we would expect him to take
the same action if he is again a mover in Node 3 of Game 2, even if payo↵s
are higher. Alternatively, higher potential payo↵s can be understood as higher
opportunity costs of continuing the game. That is, if a player continues the
game in Node 1 of Game 1 with an opportunity cost of 1 euro –his payo↵ is case
his opponent then decides to end the game at his turn–, would he continue the
game in Node 3 of Game 3, where his opportunity cost ascends to 3 euros? Last,
in Node 2 of Game 2 we find one exception: continuing the game is the salient
solution. Indeed, here both players will be better o↵ if the game continues.
Those players stopping here signal a non-benevolent player, as opposed to the
benevolent player that continues the game if the game reaches Node 4.
The four games are played twice in order to test our Hypothesis 2 to 4. Here
we need to disentangle the information at disposal in each decision node. On
the one hand, we find information coming from learning e↵ects derived from the
specificities of each game (payo↵ functions) as well as from playing the centipede
game repeatedly. On the other hand, we find information about the opponent’s
age group, as we explain in the Procedures. Hence, we confront the same player
to the same decision twice to test on his actions and reactions.
2.1 Subject Pool
All participants were German native speakers with di↵erent backgrounds and
income levels. To control for possible asymmetries across sessions we controlled
for subjects’ experience, and we only invited participants that have not pre-
viously taken part in an economic experimental study (Friedman and Cassar,
2004; Croson, 2005). All participants knew that only native German speakers
were invited to take part of the sessions. This was desirable for two reasons.
First, as our aim is at studying age related di↵erences, we needed a homoge-
neous population in order to avoid stereotypes linked to di↵erent nationalities
or languages. Second, we based much of our questionnaire on the European
Social Survey2 (ESS) run in Germany. In order to generalize the results of our
research, we needed to approach our sample to the ESS one.
Our sample consists of 1923 participants from the state of Bremen, Germany.
Half of the sample was composed of participants aged between 18 and 26 years
old, while the other half of the sample involved participants older than 55 years.
The average age for the Juniors cohort was 21.7 years old, with a median of 21
and a standard deviation of 2.32. For the Senior cohort the average is of 63,8
years old, with a median of 63 and a standard deviation of 6.54. Both cohorts
2ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data (2010). Data file edition 3.0.
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway. Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.
3Unfortunately, a total of 21 participants did not show up to the session, for which the
data points corresponding to their pairs was simulated, but drawn out of our sample. Given
that, for some nodes, the total number of observations may not coincide with the number of
games that continued at the previous node. Last, one session su↵ered of technical problems
that forced us to cancel the centipede game from the schedule. All data points where missing
completely at random.
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exhibit similar figures to the ESS, except for the dispersion of the older cohort,
which is of 8.13.
2.2 Procedures
The experiment took place at the Jacobs University Bremen Laboratory for
Social Sciences. We conducted 16 sessions, each lasting less than 1 hour. At
the beginning of each session, the instructions4 were read out loud to all the
participants to ensure common knowledge about the rules of the game. Partic-
ipants were then matched in pairs and were asked to participate in 8 rounds,
corresponding to playing twice the four games detailed in Figure 2. That said,
in round 1 (R1) participants played game 1, in round 2 (R2) they played game 2,
in round 3 (R3) they played game 3, in round 4 (R4) they played game 4, and in
rounds 5 to 8 (R5 to R8) they played again games 1 to 4 in the same order and
maintaining the same roles as before, thus allowing to control for experience.
Before each round, the participants faced a screen informing them about the
age cohort of the partner; i.e. whether the partner was older or younger than
55 years old. At least 4 matching groups took part in each session, and only
one round at random was e↵ectively payed.
The experiment was computerized and run utilizing the zTree software (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Figure 3 illustrates a picture of the screen as the participants
would see it.
Figure 3: Centipede Game: A Picture of the Screen
4Instructions are available under demand. Please contact the Editor for further information
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A set of control questions was asked to test for the participants’ under-
standing of the experiment. After the 8 rounds, the participants realized a
distributional preferences incentivized task (Balafoutas et al., 2012) and were
then asked to solve a race game against the computer (Gneezy et al., 2010) to
test for the ability for backward inductive reasoning. Finally, they filled out
a survey composed of demographic and social (trust) questions taken from the
ESS, as before mentioned. We payed all participants privately in cash at the
end of the session.
3 Experimental Results and Discussion
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show stop rates at each node. Figure 4 pools data across
players and rounds; Figure 5 pools data across rounds but distinguishes the data
according to the age group of the players.
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Figure 4: Pooled Rounds: Probability of Stopping, by Node
In line with previous research (cf. Introduction), Figure 4 and Figure 5 show
that stop rates increase during the game until reaching the last Node. Indeed,
contrary to the backward induction argument, only 18% of the games end at
the first node. Then, after the first node, the probabilities of stopping are never
even near to the theoretically expected 100% stopping rates. Moreover, in Node
4, 67% of the games continue. That said, our results are in line with previous
experimental studies questioning the strength of the backward induction argu-
ment.
However, Figure 5 explicits another salient feature that we aim to discuss
further in this article: even though overall both age groups exhibit similar prob-
abilities of stopping in Nodes 1 to 3, that changes in Node 4: seniors show a
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Figure 5: Pooled Rounds: Probability of Stopping, by Age Group and Node
stopping rate nearly 60% higher that juniors. It seems that in the last node,
there where continuing the game guarantees a loss for the mover, seniors’ prob-
ability of stopping is higher than juniors’. This would be suggesting that seniors
decision making would be payo↵ motivated.
From Figure 4 we observe that 70% of the players reaching Node 4 decide
to continue the game to the equitable payo↵, even if they have to incur into a
loss.
Taken altogether, these first findings suggest there must exist non backward
inductive arguments behind the choices of participants belonging to any age
groups.
3.1 Backward Induction Reasoning
We have noted in the Introduction two reasons why a player might choose not
to stop the game in the first node, and those are related to following a di↵erent
strategy than backward induction, which could be resumed to altruist imitator
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) and other regarding preferences (Rabin, 1993;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). A third reason
we mentioned is related to an inability to reason following backward induction
(Gneezy et al., 2010; Levitt et al., 2011).
To test for backward induction, all subjects were asked to play a race to
20 game (Gneezy et al., 2010) against the computer. In this version of the
game, both the computer and the players in turns choose a number between
1 and 9. The first to hit exactly 20, wins. The computer starts in order to
make sure that the subjects have always the chance to win. If the participant
wins, he increases his total earnings by 3 euros, otherwise he earns 0 euros.
The race game allows us to observe the ability to follow backward induction
reasoning, since it eliminates strategical concerns, as well as beliefs related to
other regarding preferences.
In our sample we find that 79 players –half of the sample– successfully solved
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the race game, and 80 players did not. We are here particularly interested
in whether those participants who successfully backward induct in the race
game choose to stop at their first chance in the centipede. Table 1 shows the
probability that the 79 players who successfully solved the race game stop at
the first chance they have to move if that chance is in Node 1, next to the
probability that the 80 players that did not successfully solved the race game
stop at this same first chance. The last column indicates the outcome of the
 2-test comparing both results. In only one of the 16 cases presented in Table
1 and Table 2 together the t-test shows significant results: Node 1, Round 7.
Given that in Node 2, Round 7, does not hold, we can think that the result is
due at random. We will investigate further on this in further section.
Table 1: Node 1: Stop Probability per Round when Race Game was Successfully
Solved (SS) versus when Race Game was Unsuccessfully Solved (US)
SS US  2-test
Round 1 6.67% 2.62% p = 0.392
Round 2 17.65% 4.88% p = 0.074
Round 3 22.22% 21.08% p = 0.897
Round 4 14.29% 19.51% p = 0.564
Round 5 24.44% 18.42% p = 0.507
Round 6 23.53% 12.20% p = 0.197
Round 7 38.64% 18.42% p = 0.045
Round 8 20.00% 24.39% p = 0.647
Table 2: Node 2: Stop Probability per Round when Race Game was Successfully
Solved (SS) versus when Race Game was Unsuccessfully Solved (US)
SS US  2-test
Round 1 25.00% 26.83% p = 0.860
Round 2 22.22% 14.29% p = 0.387
Round 3 48.83% 53.33% p = 0.513
Round 4 21.62% 12.50% p = 0.319
Round 5 26.67% 33.33% p = 0.513
Round 6 18.92% 9.09% p = 0.241
Round 7 44.00% 55.56% p = 0.405
Round 8 41.18% 21.88% p = 0.092
The 79 players who successfully solved the race game and thus proved to
have skills to reason using backward induction, in the first two Nodes where
the orthodox backward induction argument should hold, their probability of
continuing is always higher than 50%. At Node 1 they stop, on average, in 2 of
ten games; at Node 2 in 3 of 10 games. These results show that not stopping at
the first chance is not driven by an inability of the mover to reason backwards.
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3.2 Learning and Beliefs
In the centipede game, actions are conditioned on beliefs. Following Petit and
Sudgen (1989), ”beliefs are determined by the data at [our] disposal”. Thus,
our first choice is only based on information about the opponent’s age group,
while our choice in further nodes incorporates learning derived from our actions
and the actions of others in previous nodes as well. In order to study beliefs in
repeated interactions, we need to disentangle learning e↵ects from the actions
(and reactions).
To explore the existence of a learning e↵ect during the course of the experi-
ment, we first look into the four games separately. A first glimpse into the data
is shown in Table 3, which reveals that from Game 1 to Game 4 seniors seem
to show a learning process that moves toward increasing the number of stops
at the first node, hence converging to the backward induction solution. This is
not true for the juniors, nor for the rest of the rounds for any age group.
Table 3: Stop Probability, per Age Group, Game and Node
Age Group Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4
Game 1
Juniors 17.1% 36.1% 36.2% 19.2%
Seniors 9.5% 20.8% 41.1% 36.1%
Game 2
Juniors 14.3% 17.4% 42.9% 24.0%
Seniors 13.8% 15.3% 63.5% 51.9%
Game 3
Juniors 25.9% 47.2% 53.1% 27.3%
Seniors 25.0% 51.7% 21.9% 47.1%
Game 4
Juniors 11.4% 22.4% 28.0% 36.7%
Seniors 26.8% 26.5% 46.7% 29.4%
Learning e↵ects could also be occurring within each game. Figure 6 exhibits
the probability that the mover choses to stop the game at each node conditional
upon reaching that node, di↵erentiating R1-4 from R5-8. The number of games
stopping in Node 2 and in Node 3 is similar for both R1-4 and R5-8. How-
ever, when looking at Node 1 and Node 4, we do find statistically significant
di↵erences among R1-4 and R5-8 ( 2-test, p = 0.005 and p = 0.029 for Nodes 1
and 4, respectively). Investigating further, we observe that in Node 1 43 games
stop in R1-4 and 45 games in R5-8, while in Node 4 these figures are of 72
and 28 respectively. This information reveals that a shift towards the backward
induction solution occurs within each game as well.
As the players do not change their roles over the rounds, we could think that
choosing to continue the game in R1-4 and to stop the game in R5-8 could be
due to a learning e↵ect: those passing first, realize that continuing the game
would not always result in higher payo↵s. If this is indeed a learning e↵ect, then
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Figure 6: Probability of Stopping, by Node
those players switching from ”continue” to ”stop” should not change their mind
more than once, regardless of the generation of their opponent.
Table 4 and Table 5 display the proportion of games ending up in each
terminal node di↵erentiating per treatment, and their implied probability con-
ditional on reaching that node, respectively. Implied probability refers here to
the odds of stopping the game conditioned upon reaching that node. In Table
4 the absolute number of games can be found in between brackets underneath
their corresponding odd5.
Conforming to previous research results, for all treatments the implied stop
probabilities increase as we get closer to the last node, except for those games
arriving at the very last node where the number of observations is normally
significantly lower than those in the previous nodes. Also, even though the
number of players stopping at the first node is much higher than in previous
experiments (cf. Introduction) where nearly 5% of the subjects stop at the very
first node, we do find similar results when it comes to the middle nodes: nearly
60% of the games stop by Node 3.
Juniors
In Node 1, we find that in Treatment I juniors’ stopping rate is weakly
significantly di↵erent and higher in R1-4 compared to R5-8 ( 2-test, p = 0.057).
For Treatment II, however, these figure is significantly di↵erent and higher in
R1-4 compared to R5-8 ( 2-test, p = 0.008).
In Node 2, even though the stopping rates for Treatments I and II are higher
in R5-8 than in R1-4 (17.6% to 31.3%, and 34.4% and 36.8%, respectively), the
di↵erences are not significant ( 2-test, p = 0.068 and  2-test, p = 0.784, re-
spectively), indicating no learning e↵ects within treatments. In Node 3, as in
Node 2, the stopping rates in R1-4 and R5-8 are not significantly di↵erent from
each other in Treatment I ( 2-test, p = 0.771), nor in Treatment II  2-test,
5For instance, in Table 5 Treatment 1.a., Node 2, the implied stop probability can be read
as ”29.7% of all the games stopped in Node 2”.
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Table 4: Stop Probability, per Treatment and Round
Treatment Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4
I. Juniors vs Juniors
a. R1 to R4 13.5% 17.6% 37.0% 40.0%
(10) (12) (20) (14)
b. R5 to R8 26.0% 31.3% 34.1% 22.2%
(19) (20) (14) (6)
II. Juniors vs Seniors
a. R1 to R4 7.7% 34.4% 39.2% 25.0%
(6) (21) (20) (6)
b. R5 to R8 23.1% 36.8% 46.2% 11.8%
(18) (21) (18) (2)
III. Seniors vs Juniors
a. R1 to R4 18.1% 33.8% 53.5% 48.3%
(15) (24) (23) (14)
b. R5 to R8 24.1% 36.1% 48.7% 50.0%
(20) (22) (19) (10)
IV. Seniors vs Seniors
a. R1 to R4 14.6% 22.2% 40.4% 32.4%
(12) (16) (21) (11)
b. R5 to R8 18.3% 18.2% 41.2% 32.3%
(15) (12) (21) 10)
p = 0.509).
Last, in Node 4, the proportion of players choosing to continue the game
seems to increase from R1-4 to R5-8 in both Treatment I and Treatment II,
though the number of observations is too small to derive conclusions in Treat-
ment II. Still, it is important to point out that the number of games arriving to
the last node is nearly the triple in the first four rounds than in the second four
rounds (14 to 6, and 6 to 2 in Treatment I and in Treatment II, respectively).
For none of the Nodes we find significant di↵erences when comparing average
stopping rates in Treatment I and Treatment II (Node I  2-test, p = 0.320; Node
II  2-test, p = 0.500; Node III  2-test, p = 0.770; Node IV  2-test, p = 0.155).
From these results we can infer that, in a first past, juniors do give se-
niors higher chances of cooperation, suggesting initial out-group favoritism (Coq
et al., 2013), but this result is fastly reversed. Additionally, the results from
Node 2 and Node 3 together would be suggesting that juniors would reveal
themselves to behave as altruist imitators when playing against seniors as much
as when playing against juniors. Overall, for juniors, learning e↵ects are not
di↵erent when facing an opponent of their same age group than when facing an
opponent of a di↵erent age group.
Seniors
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Table 5: Implied Stop Probability, per Treatment and Round
Treatment Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4
I. Juniors vs Juniors
a. R1 to R4 13.5% 29.7% 56.8% 75.7%
b. R5 to R8 26.0% 53.4% 72.6% 80.8%
II. Juniors vs Seniors
a. R1 to R4 7.7% 34.6% 60.3% 67.9%
b. R5 to R8 23.1% 50.0% 73.1% 75.6%
III. Seniors vs Juniors
a. R1 to R4 18.1% 47.0% 74.7% 91.6%
b. R5 to R8 24.1% 50.6% 73.5% 85.5%
IV. Seniors vs Seniors
a. R1 to R4 14.6% 34.1% 59.8% 73.2%
b. R5 to R8 18.3% 32.9% 58.5% 72.0%
Turning our attention to the seniors, we find that in Treatment III, the
number of players stopping at their first opportunity does not significantly di↵er
from the first four rounds to the second four rounds, nor in Node I ( 2-test,
p = 0.341), nor in Node II ( 2-test, p = 0.786). The di↵erences are also not
significant for Treatment IV, both for Node I ( 2-test, p = 0.528) and for Node II
( 2-test, p = 0.555), suggesting consistent behavior regardless of the age group
of their opponent. However, the stopping rates in the first two nodes are lower
in Treatment IV compared to Treatment III –though only highly significant
for Node 2 ( 2-test, p = 0.007)–, implying and in-group e↵ect: in a first pass,
seniors would be giving higher chance to cooperate to seniors than to juniors.
In Node 3, seniors do not exhibit significant di↵erences in average stopping
rates when comparing Treatment III to Treatment IV (Node 3  2-test, p =
0.156; Node 4  2-test, p = 0.071), nor they do between their choice in R1-4
compared to their choice in R5-8 in Treatment III (Node 3  2-test, p = 0.666;
Node 4 p = 0.935) and Treatment IV (Node 3 p = 926; Node 4 p = 0.993).
The significantly higher stopping rates in Treatment III compared to Treat-
ment IV, suggest an initial in-group e↵ect for the age group of seniors: seniors
prefer cooperating with seniors more than with juniors. Together with the re-
sults from Table 5 showing that the number of games ending in Treatment IV
is significantly smaller than in Treatment III, we can say that for seniors, the
in-group e↵ect o↵sets the learning e↵ects.
Juniors and Seniors
A last result derives from the analyses of the e↵ect of other regarding pref-
erences within our games, and comes from looking at decisions in Node 2 in
Game 2 and in Node 4 of all games.
In Node 2 of Game 2, seniors and juniors do not show significant di↵erences
in their stop probabilities ( 2-test, p = 0.734). Additionally, choosing to con-
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tinue the game, is here not associated to other regarding preferences (Balafoutas
et al., 2012) for seniors ( 2-test, p = 0.097) nor for juniors ( 2-test, p = 0.230),
which makes us believe that the altruist imitator strategy may be in place.
For the last node, we find that other regarding preferences are not associated
to the decision of continuing the game, not for seniors ( 2-test, p = 0.211) nor
for juniors ( 2-test, p = 0.092), which makes us think that the choice is related
to positive reciprocity rather than to benevolence: people are willing to sacrifice
their own payo↵ to help those that they think have been kind to them (Rabin,
1993). Additionally, when looking at the probability of stopping per age group
at this node, we find that it is for seniors, on average, 15% higher than for
juniors ( 2-test, p = 0.056) and nearly the double when it comes to Game 2
where the stakes are much higher ( 2-test, p = 0.039).
The validity of these results increase as we confirm they are not income
related: we find no association between juniors’ decision to pass in the last node
and income ( 2-test, p = 0.880), nor between seniors’ decision to pass in the
last node and income ( 2-test, p = 0.408).
We complement the analysis by looking at profits of both age groups. Here
we find that juniors do not show significant di↵erent profits when playing against
juniors than when playing against seniors (two sided test, p = 0.172), but seniors
do. Indeed, seniors matched with seniors exhibit significantly higher profits than
when matched with juniors (two sided test, p = 0.021), and the magnitude is of
nearly 20% higher (almost 1 sum). This di↵erence remains significant for seniors
playing against seniors and stopping in Node 4 ( 2-test, p = 0.038), but at a
magnitude of 45% di↵erence (2 sums). This suggest that seniors, on average,
reach higher nodes when playing against seniors, reinforcing the in-group argu-
ment, but in Node 4 they are more likely to stop than to continue. As a matter
of fact, only for seniors this result goes in line with previous research suggesting
that group identity manipulations increase positive reciprocity among in-group
partners (Chen and Li, 2009).
So far these results imply that for seniors reciprocity is payo↵ and in-group
driven, and occurs for lower opportunity costs.
3.3 Beliefs and Age
We have so far analyzed learning e↵ects within and between games over the
course of the sessions. Focusing in beliefs purely based on the information
about the opponent’s age group requires analyzing only decisions in the first
node more in detail, knowing ex-ante what corresponds to learning e↵ects: do
both age groups converge to the self interest equilibrium solution in the same
manner? Figure 7 shows the stop probabilities at the first node at each round
and for each treatment.
These figures show the reactions –per round– of both juniors and seniors to
the di↵erent opponents they face. As we can observe, the convergence toward
the backward induction solution seems to be happening in Treatment I across
games; in Treatment II across rounds; in Treatment III from R1 to R4 and from
R5 to R8; and in Treatment IV only in R1-R4. From R5 on, as the rounds
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Figure 7: Percentage of ”Stop” in Node 1 per Round
repeat again, we can think that belief formation already occurred.
Following these lines, juniors when playing against juniors show lower rates
of convergence than when playing against seniors. Indeed, in Treatment I their
decisions are much more round-dependent than when playing against seniors,
where they mostly choose to continue, until reaching R5 where they do just
start stopping at increased rates, showing a clear adjustment of beliefs. Seniors
converging from R1-4 and from R5-8 in Treatment III is showing that they do
allow themselves to re-form beliefs about juniors, even though the higher stop
rates in R5-8 compared to R1-4 would be also revealing more cautiousness. This
is not the case when they play among themselves, where the stop rate increases
from R1to R4, and then stays nearly constant and at relatively much higher
levels compared to the rest of their choices, revealing that decisions are done
regardless of the payo↵ specifications, thus favoring in-group partners.
Finally, in both Treatment I and Treatment IV (R5-8) where subjects play
against their same age group, they seem to ”experiment” (Palacios-Huerta and
Volij, 2009, p. 17) with their decisions, by switching from stopping to continuing
over and over. Hence, although behavior adjusts to beliefs about the other age
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group, taˆtonnement or experimentation mainly occurs when playing against
subjects belonging to the same age group, but seniors show a lower overall
variance.
These results suggest that the age group identity of the players can define
their payo↵s and the others’ (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), and that seniors,
di↵erent to juniors, incorporate age group identity as an argument of their
utility function.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we explore repeated sequential interactions among juniors and
seniors. We used a centipede game to see how beliefs about the opponent’s
age group shape that interaction. We find that juniors and seniors adjust their
decisions depending on who they play against. We showed that this behavior is
not related to any inability to backward induct or to other regarding preferences,
but depends on the players’ beliefs about the other player’s age group.
In the centipede game, cooperation leads to higher payo↵s. In line with
Chen and Li (2009) our findings show the existence of an in-group e↵ect, but
only for seniors, who exhibit the highest payo↵s when playing against seniors.
Taˆtonnement or experimentation mainly occurs when participants play against
subjects belonging to the same age group, and its variance is higher for juniors,
suggesting that their in-group actions are driven by uncertainty.
Our results confirm the very recent findings of Tremewan and Wagner (2013)
on the e↵ects of group identity on outcomes, by showing that juniors and seniors
behavior in a cooperation game depends on their beliefs about the behavior of
the member of the other age group, and not –only– on other regarding prefer-
ences.
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